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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(2000) because this is a civil action arising under the laws of the
United States, specifically, the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (2000). In this action, Industry Plaintiffs seek reversal of a final agency action of EPA under the actions reviewable provision of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
This appeal of the final decision of the U.S. District Court is
brought as a matter of right under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000). Industry Plaintiffs filed this appeal in a timely manner on September 5, 2007 in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR
REVIEW
1. Whether Environmental Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Pesticide Rule.
2. Whether the challenges to the Pesticide Rule should have
been brought directly in the Court of Appeals pursuant to 33
U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (2000), precluding district court jurisdiction
over any challenge to the Pesticide Rule.
3. Whether, if this Court determines these cases should have
been commenced in the Court of Appeals, the Court should equitably toll the 120 day statute of limitations of § 1369(b)(1).
4. Whether Industry Plaintiffs' challenge is ripe under the
doctrine of Abbott Laboratoriesv. Gardner.
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5. Whether the Pesticide Rule's exemption of specified pesticide application activities from the CWA permitting program was
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.
6. Whether the failure of the Pesticide Rule to include within
its exemption pesticide residues, pesticides applied in violation of
FIFRA requirements, and pesticides applied distant from water
but which drift into water was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In this case, two sets of plaintiffs each challenge the scope and
validity of the Pesticide Rule issued by Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") on November 27, 2006 which adopts an amendment to 40 C.F.R. § 122 adding an exemption to National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permitting
requirements under the Clean Water Act ("CWA") in two
circumstances.
On February 23, 2007, Laconic Baykeeper, Inc., Ima Fisher,
and Sam Schwimmer ("Environmental Plaintiffs") filed their complaint in No. 07CV1015. On February 24, 2007, New Union Farmers Institute, Union of New Union Pesticide Applicators, Happy
Valley Farm Inc., and Wiccillum Copters, Inc., ("Industry Plaintiffs") filed a complaint in No. 07CV1016. Thereafter, the cases
were consolidated and the district court held trial proceedings.
The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor
of Environmental Plaintiffs declaring the Pesticide Rule to be null
and void to the extent that it exempts biological pesticides and
non-aquatic pesticides from NPDES requirements, and granted
summary judgment dismissing Industry Plaintiffs' complaint for
lack of ripeness. On September 5, 2007, Industry Plaintiffs and
Environmental Plaintiffs both appealed in No. 07-1001 and 071002. EPA cross-appealed asserting that the district court lacked
jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 27, 2006, in response to several judicial decisions addressing the question whether the discharge of pesticides
registered under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") to waters required a separate permit under the
CWA, EPA amended the Code of Federal Regulations to exempt
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two categories of pesticide application from the permitting requirements of 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000). R. at 4, 6-7. The Pesticide
Rule exempts 1) application of pesticides directly to water to control pests in water and 2) application of pesticides over or near
water to control pests over or near water that result in pesticides
being discharged to water. R. at 4-5.
Environmental Plaintiffs included Laconic Baykeeper, Inc.
("LBK"), Ima Fisher ("Fisher"), and Sam Schwimmer ("Schwimmer"). R. at 5. LBK, a not-for-profit environmental organization
whose members were various recreational and commercial users
of Laconic Bay, opposed the use of pesticides in or near Laconic
Bay. R. at 5. Fisher and Schwimmer were members of LBK and
submitted affidavits describing their use of Laconic Bay and its
surrounding tributaries and their concern for possible impacts to
them from the use of pesticides. R. at 5.
Industrial Plaintiffs included the New Union Farmers Institute ("NUFI") - a trade association representing the farming industry in New Union; the Union of New Union Aerial Pesticide
Applicators ("UNUAPA") - a trade association representing aerial
pesticide applicators in New Union; Happy Valley Farm - a corn
grower; and Wiccillum Copters - a UNUAPA member that served
farmers surrounding Laconic Bay and had a conditional contract
with the City to conduct mosquito control operations. R. at 5-6.
The City of Progress developed the Mosquito Control Plan
("Plan") to combat the spread of the West Nile Virus in the event
that a significant number of infected mosquitoes or birds were
identified. R. at 6. The Plan included application of BTI, a nonchemical biological mosquito larvicide, to tidal salt marshes adjacent to Laconic Bay. R. at 6. BTI was a bacterium generally considered safer for aquatic life than chemical larvicides. R. at 6.
The Plan also included application of Anvil 10 + 10, a chemical adulticide, from helicopters flying directly over the Laconic
Bay saltmarshes. R. at 6. The active ingredient of Anvil 10 + 10
was resmithrin, a synthetic chemical that mimics pyrethrin, a
naturally occurring chemical insecticide that can be extracted
from chrysanthemum flowers. Pyrethroids, including resmithrin,
were toxic to fish. R. at 6.
At the time of filing, the City had not yet applied either pesticide to Laconic Bay's salt marshes. R. at 6. Still, Environmental
Plaintiffs submitted affidavits claiming adverse impacts of these
applications in other cities. R. at 6. In July 2007, the City identified infected birds and mosquito populations in tidal marshes on
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Laconic Bay and planned to shortly commence pesticide operations according to its Plan. R. at 7.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Constitution provides that federal courts may only resolve actual cases or controversies. In the present case, Environmental Plaintiffs have failed to qualify for standing because at the
time of filing it was wholly speculative whether they would suffer
an actual or imminent injury, and because a judgment in their
favor will not force EPA to require the City of Progress to obtain
an NPDES permit for its Mosquito Control Plan.
The CWA provides for exclusive Court of Appeals jurisdiction
for certain claims. However, jurisdiction in the district court was
proper in the present case because the Pesticide Rule is neither an
effluent limitation, nor an action in issuing or denying a permit.
Should this Court find that jurisdiction in the district court
was not proper, equitable tolling applies to the Industry Plaintiffs'
suit since their challenge is similar to claims against private parties, and because no good reason exists to believe that Congress
intended otherwise. In addition, the purpose of the statute of limitations under § 1369(b)(1) would not be served by denying Industry Plaintiffs judicial access since Industry Plaintiffs had already
placed EPA on notice of its challenge by timely filing their complaint in the district court.
Industry Plaintiffs' challenge is purely a legal one ripe for judicial review; not an abstract disagreement over an EPA policy.
Industry Plaintiffs present a legal challenge to the determinations
made by EPA in its final rule. These determinations create a
hardship for Industry Plaintiffs in that the plaintiffs risk violation
of the CWA permitting requirements when applying terrestrial
pesticides.
EPA did reasonably act within its authority to exempt certain
pesticide applications from the CWA permitting requirements because its interpretation is consistent with the CWA's definition of
"pollutant." Aquatic chemical pesticides applied in compliance
with relevant FIFRA requirements are not within the ordinary
meaning of "chemical wastes" and therefore, are not pollutants
subject to NPDES permitting requirements. Non-aquatic chemical pesticides are also not pollutants under the CWA since they
are not "chemical wastes" at the time of discharge, which is what
the Act seeks to regulate under its NPDES program. In addition,
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because the plain meaning of the term "biological materials" is
ambiguous, EPA's interpretation of its meaning in light of the
CWA's goals and legislative history is reasonable and should be
accorded deference by the courts.
Finally, the Pesticide Rule's failure to exempt pesticide residues, pesticides applied in violation of FIFRA requirements, and
pesticides applied distant from water but which drift into water
was arbitrary and against the clearly expressed intent of Congress
because FIFRA provides extensive regulation of pesticide use.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo and must determine whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. Southeast Alaska
Conservation Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Engr's, 486 F.3d 638
(9th Cir. 2007). De novo review of a district court judgment concerning a decision of an administrative agency means the court
views the case from the same position as the district court. Id.
(citations omitted). Judicial Review of administrative decisions
under the CWA is governed by section 706 of the APA. Under the
APA, a court may set aside an agency action if the court determines that the action was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Id. (citations
omitted). This Court reviews issues of statutory interpretation de
novo. Res. Invs., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 151 F.3d 1162,
1165 (9th Cir. 1988).
ARGUMENT
I. Environmental Plaintiffs Do Not Have Standing
To Challenge The Pesticide Rule Because Their
Alleged Injury Was Not Imminent At The Time
Of Filing And Is Not Redressable By A
Favorable Judgment.
The "case or controversy" requirement of Article III of the
Constitution establishes an "irreducible constitutional minimum
of standing" required for both constitutional and statutory claims.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). To qualify for standing, a plaintiff must show: 1) it has suffered an "injury
in fact" that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or
imminent, as opposed to conjectural or hypothetical; 2) the injury
must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant;
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and 3) it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. In addition,
when a federal agency's action forms the basis of the complaint, to
obtain judicial review under the APA, "the plaintiff must establish
that the injury he complains of ...falls within the 'zone of interests' sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint." Lujan v. Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990); 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000).
In the present case, Environmental Plaintiffs have failed to
establish standing because they have not alleged an imminent injury that is capable of redress by a federal court.
A. At the time of filing, Environmental Plaintiffs had not
suffered an actual or imminent injury in fact
because it was wholly speculative whether the
City would ever apply pesticides to Laconic
Bay.
To satisfy the "injury in fact" requirement, the asserted injury
must be actual or imminent. In Defenders of Wildlife, the Court
stressed that the imminence standard "cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not
too speculative for Article III purposes." 504 U.S. at 565 n. 2.
Similarly, in Whitmore, the Court declared, "[a]llegations of possible future injury do not satisfy the requirements of Art[icle] III.
495 U.S. at 158.
The policy behind the "actual or imminent" requirement is
based on the recognition that "[w]ere all purely speculative increased risks deemed injurious, the entire requirement of actual
or imminent injury would be rendered moot, because all hypothesized, non-imminent injuries could be dressed up as increased risk
of future injury." NRDC v.EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
Moreover, the requirement that a plaintiff show that the particularized injury is at least "imminent" reduces the possibility that a
court might unconstitutionally render an advisory opinion by "deciding a case in which no injury would have occurred at all," Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564 n. 2.
In the present case, the district court's reliance on United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973), see R. at 9, to disregard the above
reasoning is misplaced. SCRAP has been severely limited to its
particular facts by subsequent decisions, and has been found to be
useless in the context of a motion for summary judgment. Nat'l
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Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 889 ("The SCRAP opinion.., has never
since been emulated by this Court, and is of no relevance here,
since it involved not a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment but
a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss); also SIERRA CLUB V. PETERSON,
185 F.3d 349, 361 n. 13 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Lujan I likely eviscerated
certain prior cases [e.g. SCRAP] that afforded.., standing where
the three-part test was not met.").
In applying the standing doctrine, the courts have held that
"standing is determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint ... [and] [t]he party invoking the jurisdiction of the court
cannot rely on events that unfolded after the filing of the complaint to establish its standing." E.g., Kitty Hawk Aircargo, Inc. v.
Chao, 418 F.3d 453, 460 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 570 n. 4 (holding that "[tihe existence of federal jurisdiction ordinarily depends on the facts as they exist
when the complaint is filed," and rejecting the argument that
events which occur after filing "retroactively create [] redressability (and hence [] jurisdiction) that did not exist at the
outset.").
In the present case, the district court held that Environmental Plaintiffs' alleged injury was "sufficiently imminent to support
standing" despite the fact that "the City of Progress has not yet
discharged pesticides into Laconic Bay." R. at 9. Instead, the
court based standing on the City's announcement of "its intention
to do so." R. at 9. However, while Environmental Plaintiffs commenced their action in February 2007, the City did not announce
its intent to commence pesticide applications until July 2007. See
R. at 7, 9. Thus, the district court based its reasoning on a statement which did not occur until four months after Environmental
Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit.
Moreover, at the time of filing, Environmental Plaintiffs
failed to allege an "injury in fact" that was "actual or imminent."
The City's Mosquito Plan calls for the application of pesticides to
Laconic Bay only "in the event that significant numbers of infected mosquitoes or birds are found." R. at 6. However, at the
time of filing the City had not yet applied pesticides to Laconic
Bay, nor had it expressed any intent to do so. R. at 6. In addition,
the record at the time of filing contains no evidence indicating
whether the numbers of infected mosquitoes or birds necessary to
initiate the Plan would ever be found. See R. at 6. Therefore,
when Environmental Plaintiffs filed the present suit, it was
wholly speculative whether the City would ever apply pesticides to
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Laconic Bay. Thus, the alleged injury to Environmental Plaintiffs
was neither "actual" nor "imminent."
B. Environmental Plaintiffs alleged injury is not fairly
traceable to EPA and capable of redress by a
federal court because overturning the Pesticide
Rule's exemptions will not force the City to
obtain an NPDES permit for the Mosquito Plan.
The causation and redressability components of standing are
interrelated. ALLEN V. WRIGHT, 468 U.S. 737, 753 (1984). The
"fairly traceable" component of constitutional standing examines
the causal connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct
and the alleged injury, whereas the "redressability" component examines the causal connection between the alleged injury and the
judicial relief requested. Id. However, "when a plaintiffs asserted injury arises from the government's allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, . . . causation and
redressability ordinarily hinge on the response of the regulated (or
regulable) third party to the government action or inaction." Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562. Thus, "when the plaintiff is
not himself the object of the government action or inaction he
challenges, standing is . . . 'substantially more difficult' to establish." Id. In Defenders of Wildlife, the Court applied this rule and
found that the plaintiffs in that case could not show redressability
because a decree on their behalf would not likely yield their desired result. See id.
Similarly, Environmental Plaintiffs seek review of a government action regulating a third party - the City. Thus, causation
and redressability in the present suit hinges on the "responsiveness" of the City to EPA's action or inaction. See Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562. Environmental Plaintiffs claim that the
Pesticide Rule injures them by allowing the City to apply pesticides without first obtaining an NPDES permit. See R. at 7. However, Environmental Plaintiffs allegation fails to account for the
fact that "[i]n the more than 30 years that EPA has administered
the CWA, the Agency has never issued an NPDES permit for the
application of a pesticide to or over water to target a pest that is
present in or over water." EPA Pesticide Rule, 71 Fed. Reg.
68,483, 68,483 (Nov. 27, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122).
Furthermore, EPA has "[never] stated in any general policy or
guidance that an NPDES permit is required for such applications." Id. Therefore, even if the Court grants standing and
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strikes down the Pesticide Rule, EPA would not require the City
to obtain a NPDES permit. As such, this Court will be unable to
redress Environmental Plaintiffs alleged injury, and Environmental Plaintiffs therefore do not have standing to maintain the present lawsuit.
II. The District Court Properly Exercised Subject Matter
Jurisdiction Over The Present Challenge To The
Pesticide Rule Because The Exemption Is Neither An
"Effluent Limitation Or Other Limitation" Nor An
Action "Issuing Or Denying A Permit."
Section 1369(b)(1) of the CWA authorizes federal courts of appeals to review final actions taken by the administrator, "(E) in
approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation," or "(F) in issuing or denying any permit." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1369(b)(1). The courts of appeals lack power to review actions of
the EPA over which § 1369(b)(1) does not specifically grant review. See CITY OF BATON ROUGE v. EPA, 620 F.2d 478, 480 (5th
Cir. 1980). In addition, the courts construe the scope of authority
granted by § 1369(b)(1) narrowly to reflect the specificity of the
CWA. See League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d
1181, 1190 n.8. (9th Cir. 2002) (counseling against expansive application of § 1369(b)). Construction of § 1369(b)(1) reveals Con-

gress' intent to apply the section narrowly. See

LONGVIEw FIBRE

Co. v. RASMUSSEN, 980 F.2d 1307, 1313 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[t]he complexity and specificity of section 1369(b) in identifying what actions of EPA under the FWPCA would be reviewable in the courts
of appeals suggests that not all such actions are so reviewable.").
Indeed, if Congress had intended for an expansive application of
§ 1369(b)(1), "it could have simply provided that all EPA action
under the statute would be subject to review in the courts of appeals, rather than specifying particular actions and leaving out
others." Id. Moreover, "[n]o sensible person accustomed to the
use of words in laws would speak so narrowly and precisely of particular statutory provisions, while meaning to imply a more general and broad coverage than the statutes designated." Id. In the
present case, the facts do not warrant § 1369(b)(1) direct appellate
review.
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The Pesticide Rule is not an "effluent limitation or
other limitation" under § 1369(b)(1)(E).

The Pesticide Rule is not an "effluent limitation or other limitation" because it does not "limit" or "restrict" quantities of pollutants. Under accepted canons of statutory interpretation, a court
must interpret statutes as a whole, giving effect to each word.
E.g., BOISE CASCADE CORP. V. U.S. EPA, 942 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir.
1991). "Limitation" is generally defined as, "[t]he act of limiting"
or "a restriction." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). Under
the CWA, "effluent limitation," means, "any restriction established
by a State or the Administrator on quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constituents
which are discharged from point sources into navigable waters."
33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (2000). The courts have also interpreted effluent limitation to mean, "a set of standards restricting the quantities of pollutants that enterprises in a given industry may
discharge." E.g., E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430
U.S. 112, 126-137 (1977); also CROWN SIMPSON PULP Co. v.
COSTLE, 599 F.2d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 1979) (rev'd on other grounds).
Under the plain meaning of § 1369(b)(1), regulations which
exempt certain discharges from the NPDES permitting process
cannot be considered effluent limitations because they are not "restrictions," or "limitations on the discretion of industry." See
ENVTL.

PROT.

INFO.

CTR.

V.

PAC.

LUMBER CO.

(EPIC), 266

F.Supp.2d 1101, 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that a regulation
exempting certain sources of pollution from permitting requirements was not subject to Court of Appeals' original jurisdiction).
To the contrary, exemptions such as the Pesticide Rule actually
give greater discretion to industry by wholly excluding it from rel-

evant requirements. See

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

(8th ed. 2004)

(defining "exemption" as, "[fireedom from a duty, liability, or other
requirement; an exception.").
In EPIC, the court considered whether it had jurisdiction to
determine the validity of an EPA regulation which provided exemptions from NPDES permitting requirements. EPIC, 266
F.Supp.2d at 1118. The court found that the provision at issue
was not "'a limitation... [or] a restriction on the untrammeled
discretion of the industry."' Id. The court explained that
"[diefining a... source as a nonpoint source does not restrict industry." Id. Instead, the court held that provision "exempts
sources of pollution" CWA requirement ... [and] "neither [plain-
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tiffs] nor [defendants] ha[ve] cited any cases that find [such] a
provision ... to be a 'limitation."' Id.
In the present case, the Pesticide Rule is not an "effluent limitation or other limitation" because it does not "restrict" or "limit"
quantities of pollutants. Instead, its interpretation of "pollutant"
exempts certain discharges from NPDES requirements. See EPA
Pesticide Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,485. Thus, the Pesticide Rule
does not "limit" or "restrict" pollutants. Instead, the Pesticide
Rule is a "categorical exemption," which is "permissive in nature,"
and "cannot in any sense of the word be considered an 'effluent
limitation or other limitation."' R. at 9.
B. The Pesticide Rule is not an action "issuing or
denying any permit" under § 1369(b)(1)(F).
EPA's attempt to bring this case within § 1369(b)(1)(F) is unavailing. Section 1369(b)(1)(F) confers appellate jurisdiction over
EPA actions "in issuing or denying any permit under § 1342." 33
U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F) (2000). Section 1342, in turn, establishes
the NPDES permitting system. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
Under the ordinary meaning of "issue" and "deny," the Pesticide Rule is not an "action issuing or denying" a permit. The term,

"issue," generally means "to send out or distribute."

BLACK'S LAW

(8th ed. 2004). Meanwhile, "denial" is generally defined as, "[a] refusal or rejection." Id. Thus, § 1369(b)(1)(F) may
be triggered by either the distribution or rejection of a permit. In
the present case, the Pesticide Rule involves neither the "issuance" nor the "denial" of a permit, because it is neither a distribution nor a refusal of a permit. Rather, the Pesticide Rule passively
exempts certain discharges from CWA permit obligations. See
EPA Pesticide Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,483. Thus, EPA's regulatory exemption of certain discharges of pesticides NPDES controls
is not the issuance or denial of a permit.
DICTIONARY

C.

The Pesticide Rule is not a rule regulating the
underlying NPDES permit procedures.

EPA's argument that § 1369(b)(1)(F) to "rules that regulate
the underlying permit procedures" does not apply to the Pesticide
Rule. NRDC v. EPA, 966 F.2d 1292, 1296-97 (9th Cir. 1992). In
extending § 1369(b)(1)(F), the court in NRDC intended to avoid
the "perverse situation" whereby it "will be able to review the
grant or denial of the permit, but will be without authority to re-
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view directly the regulations on which the permit is based." EPIC,
266 F. Supp. 2d at 1114 (quoting NRDC v. EPA, 656 F.2d 768, 775
(D.C. Cir. 1981)).
However, the Pesticide Rule is not a rule regulating permit
procedures. Instead, its terms ensure that NPDES permit procedures will never be required for certain discharges. See EPA Pesticide Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,485. Thus, the rationale for
subsection (F) jurisdiction is absent. See EPIC, 266 F. Supp. 2d at
1115 ("Because EPIC challenges a decision that in effect excludes
sources from the NPDES program, the circuit courts will never
have to confront the issuance or denial of a permit for these
sources."). Equally unhelpful is the district court's reliance on
American Mining Congress v. EPA (AMC), 965 F.2d 759 (9th Cir.
1992), which contained no direct analysis of § 1369(b)(1)(F). See
AMC, 965 F.2d 759-763. Accordingly, the Pesticide Rule is not a
provision regulating the underlying permit procedures.
D.

Judicial efficiency does not justify granting
exclusive Court of Appeals review.

EPA's argument that judicial efficiency would be better
served by having review of CWA regulations in one court of appeals rather than in the district courts is unpersuasive. Responding to the same policy based arguments, the court in EPIC refused
to stretch the language of § 1369(b)(1) to include a similar exemption because § 1369(b)(2) "bars judicial review of any action that
falls within section [N 1369(b)(1)] 'in any civil or criminal proceeding for enforcement."' EPIC, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 1114. The court
emphasized that the Ninth Circuit has counseled against broad
construction of § 1369(b)(1)(F), noting the "peculiar sting" of section § 1369(b)(2). Id. (citing Longview Fibre, 980 F.2d at 1313.).
Thus, the district court in the present case correctly dismissed
this argument.
In conclusion, the district court properly exercised subject
matter jurisdiction in the present case.
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III. This Court Should Equitably Toll The 120 Day
Statute Of Limitations Because A Presumption
Of Equitable Tolling Applies And Industry
Plaintiffs Actively Pursued Their Judicial
Remedies By Filing Their Pleading During The
Statutory Period.
Even if Industry Plaintiffs should have brought their challenge directly in this Court of Appeals pursuant to 33 U.S.C.
§ 1369(b)(1), the timely filing of their complaint in the district
court is justification for equitable tolling of the 120 day statute of
limitations.
A presumption in favor of equitable tolling applies to suits
against the EPA. See United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347,
350 (1997). Moreover, equitable tolling has been allowed in situations where the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory period.
Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990). Industry Plaintiffs filed their complaint within the statute of limitations period, but in the wrong court. It would be unfair to now
preclude them from pursuing their rights because of this defective
pleading.
A.

Industry Plaintiffs' suit against EPA has a
presumption in favor of equitable tolling.

The same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants applies to suits against the
United States, but the government may rebut the presumption by
demonstrating that the claims at issue are dissimilar to claims
against private parties or by showing that there is good reason to
believe Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply. Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 350.
In this case, the government cannot rebut the presumption
because claims against private parties are similar to suits under
§ 1369(b)(1). The critical issue in looking for analogous suits
among private parties is whether a private suit exists which asserts rights against a private defendant similar to the rights asserted, pursuant to the federal statute, against the government.
Four Rivers Inv., Inc. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 592, 597 (Fed.
Cl. 2007). In Irwin, the Court concluded that because private defendants could be sued under the federal statute in issue, and because the applicable time limitation could be equitably tolled in
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lawsuits between private litigants, Congress must have intended
for the time limitation to be equitably tolled in lawsuits against
the government. 498 U.S. at 95. Similarly, the CWA allows for
civil suits by any citizen against any alleged violator, including
the government, of the CWA or against the EPA for failure to perform any nondiscretionary act or duty. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000).
Thus, because private defendants could also be sued under the
CWA, Congress must have intended for the time limitation to be
equitably tolled in lawsuits against the government as well.
Furthermore, there is no good reason to believe Congress did
not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply to § 1369(b)(1). In
Brockamp, the statute at issue set forth its time limitations in unusually emphatic form. 519 U.S. at 350. The limitations were set
forth in a highly detailed technical manner that, linguistically,
could not easily be read as containing implicit exceptions. Moreover, the limitations were reiterated several times in several different ways. Id. However, unlike the statute in Brockamp,
§ 1369(b)(1) uses fairly simple language that can plausibly be read
as containing an implied equitable tolling exception.
Section 1369(b)(1) also provides for an application after 120
days "only if such application is based solely on grounds which
arose after such 120th day." 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1). However,
this provision should not be read as a limitation. By including
this provision, Congress did not intend to make the equitable tolling doctrine unavailable for any and all other applications past
120 days. Rather, to ensure fairness and equity, Congress provided for this extended period in the event that the grounds for a
plaintiffs claim did not arise until after the expiration of 120 days.
Nothing in this language excludes an equitable tolling exception.
Thus, because Industry Plaintiffs' claims are similar to claims
against private parties, and because there is no good reason to believe Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply,
the presumption of equitable tolling applies to Industry Plaintiffs'
claims.
B.

Equitable tolling should apply because Industry
Plaintiffs actively pursued their judicial
remedies by filing their pleading during the
statutory period.

Statutes of limitations are primarily designed to assure fairness to defendants. Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424,
428 (1965). Moreover, the courts should to be relieved of the bur-
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den of trying stale claims when a plaintiff has slept on his rights.
Id. (citation omitted.)
However, this policy of repose designed to protect defendants
is frequently outweighed where the interests of justice require
vindication of the plaintiffs rights. Id. Thus, courts have allowed
equitable tolling in situations where the plaintiff has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the
statutory period. See id. (plaintiff timely filed complaint in wrong
court); Herb v. Pitcairn, 325 U.S. 77 (1945) (same); Am. Pipe &
Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974) (plaintiffs timely filing of
a defective class action tolled the limitations period as to the individual claims of purported class members).
Similarly, Industry Plaintiffs did not sleep on their rights but
brought an action within the statutory period in the district court
of competent jurisdiction. Industry Plaintiffs failed to file their
action in the court of appeals solely because they believed their
action in the district court was sufficient. EPA could not have relied upon the policy of repose embodied in the statute of limitation, for it was aware that Industry Plaintiffs were actively
pursuing their judicial remedy.
Thus, if this Court determines that Industry Plaintiffs' claims
should have been commenced in the Court of Appeals, Industry
Plaintiffs respectfully ask that this Court equitably toll the 120
day statute of limitations.
LV.

Industry Plaintiffs' Claim Is Fit For A Judicial
Decision Because It Is A Legal Challenge To A
Final Rule By Epa And Withholding Court
Review Would Be A Hardship For Industry
Plaintiffs Who Would Run Civil And Criminal
Risks.

The ripeness doctrine does not preclude judicial review of Industry Plaintiffs challenge.
The basic purpose of the ripeness doctrine is to prevent the
courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial
interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging
parties.
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Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-149 (1967). But the
challenge here is not an abstract disagreement over an EPA policy. Rather, Industry Plaintiffs challenge a rule that EPA has
made final. R. at 7. As a result of EPA's Pesticide Rule, Industry
Plaintiffs risk violation of the CWA when applying terrestrial
pesticides.
The ripeness doctrine of Abbott Laboratories requires the
court to evaluate the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and
the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. Id.
at 149. To do so, the court must consider: (1) whether delayed
review would cause hardship to the plaintiffs; (2) whether judicial
intervention would inappropriately interfere with further administrative action; and (3) whether the courts would benefit from further factual development of the issues presented. OHIO FORESTRY
AsS'N, INC. V. SIERRA CLUB,

523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998).

Withholding court review would impose a hardship on Industry Plaintiffs who currently run civil and criminal risks for applying pesticides without an NPDES permit. Moreover, judicial
intervention would not interfere with further EPA action since the
Pesticide Rule is final. Finally, further factual development proposed by EPA on the issue of pesticide drift will not benefit the
court since it does not relate to whether pesticide drift constitutes
a "pollutant" under the CWA.
A.

Industry Plaintiffs' claim is a legal challenge to a
final rule by EPA.

The district court found that the question whether particular
pesticide applications involve discharges to water subject to CWA
permitting is highly fact bound, and therefore, not fit for judicial
review. But Industry Plaintiffs' claim is a legal challenge to EPA's
interpretation of the term "pollutant" under the CWA. Specifically, EPA determined that residual materials from pesticide applications as well as applications that are not in compliance with
FIFRA requirements are "pollutants" under the CWA. EPA Pesticide Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,489. Since both parties moved for
summary judgment in the district court, and, as explained below,
further administrative proceedings are unlikely, the issue in this
case is purely a legal one. See Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149.
The finality element required for a case to be fit for judicial
review is interpreted in a flexible and pragmatic way. Abbott
Labs., 387 U.S. at 149-150. In Frozen Food Express v. United
States, 351 U.S. 40, 41 (1956) the Interstate Commerce Commis-
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sion issued an order that specified commodities that were not "agricultural" within the meaning of the agricultural exemption
under the Interstate Commerce Act. The Commission listed those
commodities that fell within the agricultural exemption and those
that did not. Id. at 42. Frozen Food Express, a motor carrier
transporting numerous commodities that it believed fell within
the agricultural exemption but which the Commission ruled were
not, filed suit to enjoin the Commission's order. Id. The Court
found that the order of the Commission was final in that it was in
substance a declaratory order which touched vital interests of carriers and set the standard for shaping the manner in which an
important segment of the trucking business will be done. Id. at
44.
In this case, EPA's Pesticide Rule, as a final agency action, is
even more dispositive of a final decision than the Commission's
order in Frozen Food. As in Frozen Food, EPA's Pesticide Rule
touches the vital interests of Industry Plaintiffs and sets the standard for shaping the manner in which pesticides will be applied, if
at all, by them.
With respect to pesticide drift, the district court found that
since EPA is currently studying the problem and may engage in
rulemaking in the future, examination of Industry Plaintiffs challenge was better deferred to a specific enforcement action or
rulemaking. R. at 10-11. However, any such action is speculative.
Moreover, the goals of EPA's Spray Drift workgroup do not relate
to whether such pesticide drift is a pollutant under the CWA.
Rather, they relate to minimizing such drift. Such goals could be
met even without a determination as to whether pesticide drift
should be exempted from the permitting requirements of CWA,
making a future ruling an unlikely outcome of the Spray Drift
workgroup.
EPA's current ruling that it will continue to follow its longstanding practice of not requiring NPDES permits for agricultural
pesticide applications conducted in compliance with relevant
FIFRA requirements, see EPA Pesticide Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. at
68,487, is, pragmatically speaking, a final ruling that pesticide
drift is not a pollutant under the CWA. Surely EPA would not
have a long-standing practice of allowing pollutants to be discharged into waters without an NPDES permit. This logic runs
contrary to the very purpose of the NPDES permitting program
under the CWA. Yet, EPA refuses to include pesticide drift that
occurs even when pesticides are applied in compliance with
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FIFRA as an exemption in its Pesticide Rule. This disconnect
leaves Industry Plaintiffs in a dilemma.
B. Withholding court review would cause a hardship to
Industry Plaintiffs.
Like the motor carriers in Frozen Foods, Industry Plaintiffs
are left in a quandary in which they must choose either to change
their manner of applying pesticides, pursue costly compliance
with NPDES permitting requirements (which may be practically
impossible for many individual farmers), or continue their usual
pesticide activities in risk of violating the NPDES permitting requirements. Thus, withholding court consideration would be an
incredible hardship to Industry Plaintiffs.
EPA need not explicitly require Industry Plaintiffs to comply
with the CWA in order for Industry Plaintiffs to fall within the
Act's ambit. By purporting to allow Industry Plaintiffs to continue
their use of pesticide applications while simultaneously determining that pesticide residues are pollutants, and leaving pesticide
drift vulnerable to this interpretation as well, EPA places Industry Plaintiffs in a state of substantial uncertainty as to whether
they are subject to the CWA permitting requirements. This state
of uncertainty is exasperated by recent case law in which courts
have found pesticide applicators in violation of the CWA. See Forsgren, 309 F.3d at 1190 (holding that application of pesticides
from a plane without a NPDES permit, that result in incidental
water contamination, amounted to a CWA violation); Headwaters,
Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 532-533 (9th Cir.
2001) (holding that residual chemical left in the water after its
application qualifies as a chemical waste product and thus as a
"pollutant" under the CWA).
Because EPA has not subjected Industry Plaintiffs to enforcement for their activities, the district court found that Industry
Plaintiffs had not experienced a hardship. However, Industry
Plaintiffs are still vulnerable to suits by citizens under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365. In light of EPA's Pesticide Rule which determines that
pesticide residue and pesticides applied in violation of FIFRA are
"pollutants" under the CWA, and explicitly does not exempt pesticide drift as a "pollutant," citizens, including environmental
groups that rigorously oppose pesticide applications, have an even
stronger argument that Industry Plaintiffs' pesticide applications
require NPDES permits. Industry Plaintiffs should not have to
wait to be sued in order to resolve the legal question of whether
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their pesticide applications constitute a "pollutant" under the
CWA.
In addition, there is a genuine threat of enforcement by EPA
if Industry Plaintiffs continue their pesticide applications which
may violate FIFRA requirements or result in pesticide residue. If
Industry Plaintiffs do not undergo costly compliance with NDPES
permitting requirements, they will be subject to civil and criminal
penalties under 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2000) for these applications. It
is this type of hardship that court consideration will relieve.
Because Industry Plaintiffs' claims involve a legal challenge
to EPA's interpretation of "pollutant" under the CWA, and because
the Pesticide Rule is a final rule impacting the manner in which
Industry Plaintiffs will apply pesticides, this claim is ripe under
the doctrine of Abbott Laboratories.
V.

The Pesticide Rule's Exemption Of Specified
Pesticide Applications Is Valid Because It Is
Consistent With The CWA's Definition Of Pollutant
And EPA's Reasonable Interpretation Of The
Ambiguous Term "Biological Materials" Is Entitled
Deference By The Court.

Although EPA was arbitrary in its decision to limit its Pesticide Rule to two categories of pesticide applications, EPA did reasonably act within its authority to exempt those applications
because its interpretation is consistent with the CWA's definition
of "pollutant."
The CWA defines the term "pollutant" to mean, among other
things, chemical wastes and biological materials. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(6) (2000). It should be generally assumed that Congress
expresses its purpose through the ordinary meaning of the words
it uses. Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission
Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 772 (1984). The district court looked to the
dictionary meaning of "waste" and found permissible EPA's interpretation that an aquatic chemical pesticide that is designed, registered, and intended to be applied to water to kill pests living in
the water is not a chemical waste when it is so applied. R. at 12.
However, the district court erred when it found that non-aquatic
chemical pesticides constitute a pollutant because such pesticides
are not a waste at the time of discharge.
The district court also erred when it determined Congress's
use of the term "biological materials" unambiguously includes bio-
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logical pesticides. The court inexplicably presumed that Congress
had the use of biological pesticides in mind when it chose the word
"materials" over "wastes." The court's reasoning involved a limited comparison of only two of the more than ten listed pollutants,
and it therefore failed to analyze whether the term "biological
materials" was ambiguous. Because the term "biological materials" is ambiguous, the question for the court is whether the
agency's interpretation is based on a permissible construction of
the CWA. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984). EPA's interpretation should be given controlling
weight unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to
the statute. Id. at 844.
A.

Aquatic chemical pesticides, applied in compliance
with relevant FIFRA requirements, do not
constitute a "pollutant"under the CWA because
the pesticides are not "chemical wastes."

The exemption of a chemical pesticide applied in compliance
with relevant FIFRA requirements is not contrary to Congress'
definition of a pollutant under the CWA. Rather, EPA's exemption
of this category is in harmony with the statute.
It is well established that statutory construction must begin
with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that
the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the
legislative purpose. Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. South Coast Air Quality
Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004) (citation omitted). EPA reasons that a pesticide applied consistent with relevant FIFRA requirements cannot constitute a chemical waste if, at the time it is
discharged into the water, it serves a useful purpose. EPA Pesticide Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,486. This is consistent with the plain
meaning of the word "waste" which is defined as that which is
"eliminated or discarded as no longer useful or required after the
completion of a process." R. at 12.
Pesticides applied consistent with relevant FIFRA requirements are products that EPA has evaluated and registered for the
purpose of controlling target organisms, and are designed, purchased, and applied to perform that purpose. EPA Pesticide Rule,
71 Fed. Reg. at 68,486 (citing Fairhurst v. Hagener, 422 F.3d
1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2005)). The pesticide application that EPA
exempted serves a useful purpose by controlling mosquito larvae,
aquatic weeds, or other pests that are present in the water.
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Therefore, such pesticide application is not a waste under the
CWA.
An agency's construction of a statute it is charged with enforcis
entitled to deference if it is reasonable and not in conflict
ing
with the expressed intent of Congress. U.S. v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985) (citing Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n. v.
NRDC, Inc, 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985); Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467
U.S. at 842-845). Pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (2000), the Administrator of EPA is in charge of administering the CWA, and
should be accorded deference in its reasonable interpretation that
specific categories of applications do not involve the discharge of a
pollutant into water. In harmony with Congress' expressed intent, it is wholly permissible that EPA exempted aquatic chemical
pesticides applied in accordance with applicable FIFRA requirements from the NPDES permitting requirements of the CWA.
B.

Non-aquatic chemical pesticides, applied in
compliance with relevant FIFRA requirements, do
not constitute "pollutants"under the CWA
because the pesticides are not "chemical
wastes" at the time of discharge.

The non-aquatic chemical pesticides described in the Pesticide Rule are not within the ambit of the NPDES permitting program. The CWA states that the "discharge of any pollutant by any
person shall be unlawful" unless such discharge is in compliance
with certain provisions of the act. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000). The
term "discharge of a pollutant" means any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(12) (2000). Thus, at the time of discharge, the addition to
water must be a pollutant. As explained above, a chemical pesticide used to control pests and administered in accordance with relevant FIFRA requirements is not a chemical "waste" under the
CWA. Since it is not a chemical waste, it is not a pollutant. And
since the application of the chemical pesticide does not equate the
discharge of a pollutant, the CWA is not triggered.
In the absence of an actual addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point, there is no point source discharge, no
statutory violation, no statutory obligation of point sources to comply with EPA regulations for point source discharges, and no statutory obligation of point sources to seek or obtain an NPDES
permit in the first instance. Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S.
EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 505 (2d Cir. 2005).
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The district court reasoned that non-aquatic pesticides that
fall into water after being used to kill pests that are not present in
water are within the dictionary definition of materials that are
"eliminated... as no longer useful." R. at 12. However, this reasoning is flawed because it fails to analyze the material at the
time of discharge. In addition, the district court incorrectly applied an ambient approach rather than the "end-of-pipe" discharge
approach to determine that an NPDES permit is required.
The pre-1972 legislation employed ambient water quality
standards as the primary mechanism for water pollution control.
MAIER V. U.S. EPA, 114 F.3d 1032, 1048 (10th Cir. 1997) (citations
omitted). The 1972 Amendments deliberately ended this approach. Id. Congress declared as the new national goal of the program that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be
eliminated. Id. Consistent with this end, the CWA substituted
technology-based, generally-applicable effluent limitations for
water quality-based regulatory approaches. Id.
In light of this history, it is apparent that, under the NPDES,
Congress focused on regulating the material being discharged
from point sources; not, as in the ambient approach, on the effect
of pollution on water quality. Thus, to trigger the NPDES, at the
time of discharge the material in the discharge must be both a
pollutant, and from a point source. See EPA Pesticide Rule, 71
Fed. Reg. at 68,487. Since the non-aquatic pesticide is not a chemical waste at the time of discharge, it is not a pollutant, and therefore, not subject to NPDES permitting requirements.
The district court found that the pesticide transforms into a
chemical waste once it falls into the water since it is no longer
being used to kill pests. R. at 12. However, even assuming this is
so, the NPDES does not seek to regulate discharges that may later
become pollutants. This issue of transformation is addressed using the ambient approach. As EPA points out, the residual should
be treated as a nonpoint source pollutant, potentially subject to
CWA programs other than the NPDES permit program. See EPA
Pesticide Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,487.
Finally, the district court's reliance on Long Island
Soundkeeper Fund, Inc. v. N.Y. Athletic Club, 1996 WL 131863, at
*13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 1996) as well as Hudson River Fisherman's
Ass'n v. City of New York, 751 F.Supp. 1088, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1990),
affd, 940 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1991) is misplaced. In Long Island the
court found that spent shot and target fragments conveyed into
the United States waters constituted pollutants within the mean-
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ing of the CWA. 1996 WL 131863, at *14. However, unlike the
pesticides at issue in this case, the spent shot and target fragments were wastes at the time of discharge.
In Hudson River the court found that a chlorine residual,
when dischargedinto navigable waters is regarded as a pollutant,
even though its intended use is a beneficial one. Hudson River,
751 F.Supp. at 1101 (emphasis added). Unlike the pesticides in
this case, the chlorine residual served no purpose at the time of
discharge and, therefore, constituted a chemical waste.
C.

EPA's interpretation of the ambiguous term
"biological materials" as excluding biological
pesticides is reasonable and should be accorded
deference under the Chevron doctrine.

Without explanation, the district court presumed that the
term "biological materials" was unambiguous. R. at 12. However,
whether the language of a statute is plain or ambiguous is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in
which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341,
(1997).
The word "material" is defined as "the matter from which a
thing is or can be made." The New Oxford American Dictionary
1054 (Elizabeth J. Jewell & Frank Abate eds., 2001). The word
"biological" is defined as "of or relating to biology or living organisms." Id. at 167. Thus, in its plain language, "biological materials" means anything made of something relating to biology or
living organisms. As EPA pointed out, taken to its literal extreme, such an interpretation could arguably mean that activities
such as fishing with bait would constitute the addition of a pollutant. See EPA Interim Statement, 68 Fed. Reg. 48,385, 48,388
(Aug. 12, 2003). Surely Congress did not intend such a broad and
far-reaching meaning.
Although, as the district court found, Congress presumably
had a reason to classify "chemicals" as pollutants only if they were
wastes, while classifying all "biological materials" as pollutants,
R. at 12, it does not necessarily follow that Congress intended to
include biological pesticides.
Considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to administrative
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interpretations has been consistently followed whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force
of the statutory policy in the given situation has depended upon
more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected
to agency regulations.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. Thus, the court need only find "that
EPA's understanding of this very 'complex statute' is a sufficiently
rational one to preclude a court from substituting its judgment for
that of EPA." Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. NatrualRes. Def Council, Inc.,
470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985). It is not the role of the court to decide
which policy choice is the better one, for it is clear that Congress
has entrusted such decisions to EPA. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503
U.S. 91, 114 (1992).
It is plausible that Congress decided to use the term biological
"materials" instead of "wastes" in order to capture aquaculture
discharges, such as escaped fish from fish farms. In fact, the cases
that the district court cites found that such biological materials
constitute pollutants. See U.S. Pub. Interest Research Group v.
Atl. Salmon, 215 F. Supp. 2d 239, 247-49 (D. Me. 2002) (non-native fish, and salmon feces and urine from salmon farm enclosures
are biological materials); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power
Co., 862 F.2d 580, 585 (6th Cir. 1988) (fish and fish parts released
from hydro-electric facility's turbine are biological materials).
However, those biological materials are very different in character and nature from biological pesticides applied consistent with
relevant FIFRA requirements. Biological pesticides are used
under FIFRA in such a way as to target pests without posing "unreasonable adverse effects" to the environment. See 7 U.S.C.
§ 136a(c)(5) (2000). In fact, the biological insecticide to be used
under the City's Plan is generally considered safer for aquatic life
than chemical larvacides. R. at 6.
Moreover, the legislative history of the CWA indicates that
EPA's interpretation of the term "biological material" is consistent
with the goals of the CWA. The maintenance of the natural chemical, physical and biological integrity of water require that any
changes in the environment resulting in a physical, chemical or
biological change in a pristine water body be of a temporary nature, such that by natural processes, within a few hours, days or
weeks, the aquatic ecosystem will return to a state functionally
identical to the original. S. REP. No. 92-414, at 76 (1972), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3742. Because FIFRA re-
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quires that no unreasonable adverse effects result, a biological
pesticide applied in accordance with FIFRA requirements will ensure that the aquatic ecosystem return to a state "functionally
identical to the original."
It is unlikely, then, that Congress had biological pesticides in
mind when deciding to use the term "materials" rather than
"wastes." This is also demonstrated by the fact that at the time
the Act was adopted in 1972, chemical pesticides were predominant. EPA Pesticide Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,486. Moreover, as
EPA points out, it would be irrational for Congress to include biological pesticides in the NPDES permitting program, while excluding chemical pesticides, as both are equally regulated under
FIFRA. R. at 12. Likewise, it would be irrational for Congress to
include the natural, biological material pyrethrin within the
CWA's ambit while excluding the synthetic chemical version,
resmithrin, when both are equally toxic to fish.
As demonstrated, EPA's interpretation of the term "biological
materials" was not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to
the CWA. Rather, it was a rational interpretation which precluded the district court from substituting its own judgment for
that of EPA. Whereas Congress may have concluded that non-indigenous species posed a greater threat than the introduction of
chemicals, R. at 12, that interpretation by the district court is not
controlling under the well-established rule of Chevron. Although
it may not agree with EPA's interpretation, under Chevron, the
district court may not supplant the interpretation with its own.
For the foregoing reasons, Industry Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court to find that EPA's Pesticide Rule, which was
based on a reasonable interpretation of the CWA, is wholly valid.
VI.

Given The Extensive Regulation Of Pesticides
Under FIFRA, EPA's Failure To Include
Pesticide Residues, Pesticides Applied In
Violation Of FIFRA Requirements, And
Pesticides Applied Distant From Water But
Which Drift Into Water Within The Exemptions
Of The Pesticide Rule, Is Against The Clear
Intent Of Congress, And Is Arbitrary And
Capricious.

The APA governs judicial review of agency action. 5 U.S.C.
§ 701 et seq. (2000). When a court reviews an agency's construction of a statute which it administers, it is confronted with two
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questions. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. First, the court must ask
"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue." Id. at 842 . If the intent of Congress is clear, the court,
must give it legal effect. Id. at 842-843. Congress' intent may be
determined by the "traditional tools of statutory construction," including the text, legislative history, and the overall purpose of the
statute.
If Congress has not directly spoken to the issue at hand, the
court must decide if the agency's action is based on a permissible
construction of the statute. Id. at 843. In this second step, the
court must give considerable weight to the agency's construction
and it may not substitute its own construction if the agency's interpretation is reasonable. Id. at 843-44. Instead, under the APA
and Chevron, a court may set aside agency action only by finding
the action "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Ctr.for
Biological Diversity v. Veneman, 335 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2003).
An agency action is arbitrary and capricious where the agency
has, "offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to
the evidence before the agency." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S.,
Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). In
the present case, Congress intended FIFRA to extensively regulate pesticide use.
A.

The overall purpose, text, requirements, and
legislative history of FIFRA reveal Congress' intent
to regulate pesticides extensively under FIFRA.

The overall purposes of FIFRA demonstrate Congress' intent
to extensively regulate the use of pesticides under its provisions.
FIFRA is a comprehensive regulatory statute which extensively
governs the registration and use of pesticides. See Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991-95, (1984) (providing a detailed
history of FIFRA). FIFRA's overall purpose is to ensure that pesticides perform their intended function without unreasonable adverse effects on the environment. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(C)-(D)
(2000). EPA accepts registration of a pesticide only upon a finding
that the pesticide "will perform its intended function without unreasonable adverse effects on the environment; and when used...
will not generally cause unreasonably adverse effects on the environment." Id.; see also Worm v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744,
747 (4th Cir. 1993).
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The text of FIFRA demonstrates Congress' intent to allocate
broad authority to EPA under the statute. FIFRA defines the
phrase, "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment" to include, "any unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking
into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and
benefits of the use of any pesticide." 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (2000). In
addition, FIFRA defines the term "environment" to include,
"water, air, land, and all plants and man and other animals living
therein, and the interrelationships which exist among these." 7
U.S.C. § 136(j) (2000). Thus, the plain text of FIFRA shows that
Congress intended FIFRA to regulate the impacts of pesticide use
on the waters of the United States.
FIFRA's requirements mandate registration with EPA of all
pesticides and herbicides sold in the United States, see 7 U.S.C.
§ 136(a) (2000), and require EPA to issue a "label" for each registered pesticide, indicating the manner in which it may be used. 7
U.S.C. §136(a)(2)(G) (2000). FIFRA makes it unlawful "to use any
registered pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling," 7
U.S.C. § 136(a)(2)(G), and provides that any use of a pesticide in a
manner inconsistent with FIFRA labeling requirements is subject
to both civil and criminal penalties. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2000). Thus,
Congress also demonstrated its intent to regulate pesticide use
under FIFRA by providing ample means for EPA to prosecute offenders of FIFRA's pesticide use requirements.
The legislative history of FIFRA confirms this construction.
The 1972 Senate Report on the proposed FIFRA amendments
states, "[FIFRA] provides for more complete regulation of pesticides in order to provide for the protection of man and his environment ....Pesticides affect the food man eats, the water he drinks,
[and] the air he breathes." S. REP. No. 92-838, at 3-9 (1972). Additionally, the report states, "[The Administer of EPA] must consider... cover to keep the rain where it falls, prevent floods, [and]
provide clear water." Id. Thus, the legislative history of FIFRA
supports a broad interpretation of FIFRA's scope.
Finally, it is worth noting that the modern versions of FIFRA
and CWA are each the result of comprehensive amendments to the
former versions of the statutes which were enacted within three
days of each other in 1972. See PUB. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 975
(Oct. 21, 1972) (FIFRA); PUB. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (Oct. 18,
1972) (Clean Water Act). Given this temporal proximity, it stands
to reason that had Congress intended to require EPA to issue
NPDES permits for the use of pesticides, it would have simply ad-
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ded pesticides to its list of "pollutants" in the 1972 amendments to
the CWA.
Moreover, the fact that these two regulatory schemes were
before Congress at the same time supports the logical finding that
Congress' failure to include pesticides within its list of "pollutants" indicates an intent to regulate pesticides under FIFRA.
Further support for this inference lies in the fact that the CWA
has a citizen suit provision, 33 U.S.C. § 1365, while FIFRA does
not. 7 U.S.C § 136 et seq. This difference shows that Congress intended to preclude individuals from suing to enforce regulations
on the use of pesticides, and instead intended to leave enforcement up to EPA and the Attorney General under FIFRA. See
ADAIR v. TROY STATE UNIV. OF MONTGOMERY, 892 F.Supp. 1401,
1405 n. 3 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (recognizing FIFRA as, "the only major
environmental statute without a citizen suit provision.").
In sum, Congress intended FIFRA to govern registration and
use of pesticides. Therefore, EPA's failure to exempt pesticide applications from CWA permit requirements went directly against
the intent of Congress and should be reversed.
B.

Assuming arguendo that Congress' intent is unclear,
EPA's promulgation of the Pesticide Rule was
arbitrary and capricious because it failed to
properly consider evidence of its own
regulatory history under the CWA.

Recently, some courts have attempted to determine the question of whether CWA permit requirements can apply to pesticide
applications. See Headwaters, 243 F.3d 526 (holding that aerial
application of insecticides required an NPDES permit); but see
Fairhurst,422 F.3d at 1149 (limiting Headwatersto its particular
facts); Forsgren,309 F. 3d at 1185 (indicating that the parties to
the suit agreed that chemical pesticides constituted pollutants);
No Spray Coal., Inc. v. City of New York, 351 F.3d 602 (2d Cir.
2004) (failing to answer the question of whether spraying in compliance with FIFRA must be deemed also to comply with CWA).
However, despite these courts' best efforts to resolve this complex issue, it became clear that, "[u]ntil the EPA articulates a
clear interpretation ... the question of whether properly used pesticides can become pollutants that violate the CWA will remain
open. EPA Pesticide Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,485 (citing Altman v.
Town of Amherst, 47 Fed. App'x. 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2002)). In promulgating the Pesticide Rule, EPA attempted to provide the needed
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"clear interpretation." Id. However, based on EPA's history of pesticide regulation, pesticides are properly regulated under FIFRA
and not the CWA.
The purpose of the CWA is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 33
U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000). To accomplish its goals EPA requires
NPDES permits for discharges of pollutants into navigable waters
from point sources. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(1) (2000). Section
1362(6) defines "pollutant" to mean (in relevant part) "chemical
wastes," and "biological materials." Throughout EPA's history of
enforcing both the CWA and FIFRA, EPA has never interpreted
the CWA to require that pesticide users obtain NPDES permits
nor has it ever said that an NPDES permit would be required for
such applications. EPA Pesticide Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68483.
Thus, EPA has never found pesticides to be "point-source pollutants" under the CWA. See id.
Instead, EPA has consistently chosen to rely on the statutory
requirements of FIFRA to regulate pesticides. See EPA Pesticide
Rule 71 Fed. Reg. at 68487 ("EPA will continue to follow its longstanding practice of not requiring NPDES permits for agricultural
pesticide applications that are conducted in compliance with relevant FIFRA requirements."). In discussing FIFRA's ability to address water quality impacts, EPA flatly stated, "registration and
use of a pesticide in accordance with... FIFRA requirements indicates that a pesticide is intended to be used for a beneficial purpose that is authorized by EPA and is not a waste." EPA Pesticide
Rule, 71 FR at 69488. Thus, the history of EPA regards FIFRA as
the proper statute to regulate pesticide use.
Despite this history, some courts and commentators advocate
CWA regulation of pesticides based on the notion that FIFRA regulations are purely national in scope and that NPDES permits
under the CWA are necessary to protect local concerns. See Headwaters, 243 F.3d at 531 ("FIFRA's labels are the same nationwide,
and so the statute does not and cannot consider local environmental conditions."); see also "Is FIFRA Enough Regulation?: Failure
to Obtain a NPDES Permit for Pesticide Applications May Violate
the Clean Water Act" 79 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 317, 340 (arguing that
CWA enforcement fills "statutory gap" between national FIFRA
provisions and local CWA provisions).
However, EPA disclaimed this argument. See EPA Pesticide
Rule 71 Fed. Reg. at 68489. EPA stated that it "disagrees with
commenters' concerns that EPA's registration process does not
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take into account local conditions." Id. EPA emphasized that
"[tihe regulatory and non-regulatory tools under FIFRA provide
means of addressing water quality problems arising from the use
of pesticides." Id. at 68488. Therefore, the admittedly "cursory
review of the statutes" undertaken in Headwaters decision is not
worthy of credence. Headwaters, 243 F.3d at 531. Instead, FIFRA
adequately and extensively responds to local concerns.
Accordingly, EPA's refusal to include within its exemption
pesticide residues, pesticides applied in violation of FIFRA requirements, and pesticides applied distant from water but which
drift into water was arbitrary and capricious because it runs
counter to the evidence before EPA.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, New Union Farmers Institute,
Union of New Union Pesticide Applicators, Happy Valley Farm
Inc., and Wiccillum Copters, Inc., respectfully request that this
Court reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the Industry Plaintiffs' complaint and the district court's
grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Environmental
Plaintiffs.
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